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Foreword
Developing Standards of Conduct for
Prosecutors and Criminal Defense Lawyers
BRUCE A. GREEN*
INTRODUCTION
This issue and a companion issue of the Hastings Constitutional Law
Quarterly' together collect sixteen papers on the professional conduct of
prosecutors and criminal defense lawyers. Typically, normative
scholarship on lawyers' professional conduct focuses on what the ethics
rules and other laws require, or should require, of lawyers. These pieces
are different, because their principal focus is not on whether lawyers'
conduct is minimally ethical or lawful, but on how lawyers should
practice within the bounds of the ethics rules and other law. That is
because the authors were asked to take unenforceable professional
standards, the ABA Criminal Justice Standards for Prosecution and
Defense Functions,' as their point of departure.
The ABA is now in the middle of the multiyear process of revising
these two sets of Standards, as Professor Rory Little, reporter to the
drafting committee, discusses in his preface to the companion issue.3 The
sixteen papers examine aspects of the 2oo9 and 20Io draft revisions. The
two sets of draft revisions with which the authors worked are subject to
change and, by the time this Foreword is published, may already have
been slightly rewritten. But the objective was not to critique the
particular language of the provisions so much as to use them as a
springboard for thinking conceptually about how prosecutors and
* Louis Stein Professor of Law and Director, Louis Stein Center for Law and Ethics.
I. Symposium,38 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 747 (20l).
2. STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: PROSECUTION FUNCTlON AND DEFENSE FUNCTION (3d ed.
1993).
3. Rory K. Little, The Role of Reporter for a Law Project, 38 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 747 (2011);
see also Ellen S. Podgor, The Role of the Prosecution and Defense Function Standards: Stagnant or
Progressive?, 62 HASTINGS L.J. 1559 (2011); Martin Marcus, The Making of the ABA Criminal Justice
Standards: Forty Years of Excellence, CRIM. JUST., Winter 2009, at 5o, 13.
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defense lawyers should conduct their work and how professional
standards should advise them.
The subjects of these papers vary. Some address conduct in which
both prosecutors and defense lawyers might engage: communicating with
and preparing witnesses, commenting publicly about pending cases,'
negotiating waiver agreements, and delivering summations.' Others
address cross-cutting professional obligations: candor, civility,' conflicts
of interest,'o and confidentiality." Some pieces address problems
particular to criminal defense lawyers: excessive public defender
workloads," the possibility of revealing client confidences to rectify a
wrongful conviction," what to do with physical evidence of a crime, 4 and
how to function in problem-solving courts." Others address problems
particular to prosecutors: for example, their exercise of charging power
and disclosure obligations."
The sixteen papers arise out of a larger project originated and
developed by the ABA Criminal Justice Section, which I have had the
privilege of chairing in 2010-2011. Drafts of these pieces were produced
in the summer of 2010 to inform a series of discussions among
prosecutors, defense lawyers, judges, and academics that were conducted
at law schools across the country in the fall of that year. The overarching
4. See Roberta K. Flowers, Witness Preparation: Regulating the Profession's "Dirty Little Secret",
38 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 1007 (2011); Melanie D. Wilson, Quieting Cognitive Bias with Standards for
Witness Communications, 62 HASTINGS L.J. 1227 (201I).
5. See Andrew E. Taslitz, The Incautious Media, Free Speech, and the Unfair Trial: Why
Prosecutors Need More Realistic Guidance in Dealing with the Press, 62 HASTINGS L.J. 1285 (2011).
6. See Jane Campbell Moriarty & Marisa Main, "Waiving" Goodbye: Plea Bargaining and the
Defense Dilemma of Competent Representation, 38 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 1o29 (2011).
7. See Daniel S. Medwed, Closing the Door on Misconduct: Rethinking the Ethical Standards
That Govern Summations in Criminal Trials, 38 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 915 (2011).
8. See Lissa Griffin & Stacy Caplow, Changes to the Culture of Adversarialness: Endorsing
Candor, Cooperation, and Civility in Relationships Between Prosecutors and Defense Counsel,
38 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 845 (2011); Kevin C. McMunigal, Investigative Deceit, 62 HASTINGS L.J. 1377
(201).
9. See Griffin & Caplow, supra note 8.
to. See Laurie L. Levenson, Conflicts over Conflicts: Challenges in Redrafting the ABA Standards
for Criminal Justice on Conflicts of Interest, 38 HASTINGS CONST. L.O. 879 (20 1).
II. See Cecelia Klingele, Confidentiality and Disclosure: What the New ABA Criminal Justice
Standards (Don't) Say About the Duties of Defense Counsel, 38 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 983 (2011).
12. See Norman Lefstein, Excessive Public Defense Workloads: Are ABA Standards for Criminal
Justice Adequate?, 38 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 949 (2011).
13. See James E. Moliterno, Rectifying Wrongful Convictions: May a Lawyer Reveal Her Client's
Confidences to Rectify the Wrongful Conviction ofAnother?, 38 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 81I (201 I).
14. See Rodney J. Uphoff, The Physical Evidence Dilemma: Does ABA Standard 4-4.6 Offer
Appropriate Guidance?, 62 HASTINGS L.J. 1177 (2011).
IS. See Ben Kempinen, Problem-Solving Courts and the Defense Function: The Wisconsin
Experience, 62 HASTINGS L.J. 1349 (2011).
16. See Bennett L. Gershman, Prosecutorial Decisionmaking in the Charging Function,
62 HASTINGS L.J. 1259 (2011).
17. See Ellen Yaroshefsky, Prosecutorial Disclosure Obligations, 62 HASTINGS L.J. 1321 (208I).
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objective of the project was to contribute to a dialogue within, and
between, the legal profession and academia on questions of professional
conduct in the criminal context, with the hope of promoting both better
understandings and better practices.
This Foreword begins by offering some thoughts on the nature of
the questions of professional conduct encountered by prosecutors and
defense lawyers and the value of developing sets of national standards
like the Criminal Justice Standards for Prosecution and Defense
Functions to offer these lawyers guidance. It then describes the project
that led to the development of the articles collected by the Hastings Law
Journal and the Hastings Constitutional Law Quarterly and its objectives,
and offers some reflections on the value of viewing individual Standards
in relation to the underlying law, to lawyers' differing roles, and to each
other. It concludes with thanks to the authors and others who
participated in this project.
1. THE IMPORTANCE OF ARTICULATING NATIONAL STANDARDS ON THE
CONDUCT OF PROSECUTORS AND DEFENSE LAWYERS
For the most part, the daily conduct of prosecutors and defense
lawyers is not dictated by ethics rules or other law, although the law may
establish limits or a framework within which these lawyers operate. For
prosecutors and defense lawyers, as for lawyers generally, professional
conduct and decisionmaking are mostly matters of professional
judgment, experience, and discretion." There are no rule books or
instruction manuals for most of what these lawyers do. Even so, there is
room for debate about how best to act, even with respect to many
routine and recurring matters.
Consider the ordinary work of prosecutors. Prosecutors make daily
decisions about whether to initiate criminal charges." How certain should
the prosecutor be that the defendant is guilty before bringing or
prosecuting charges? As a legal matter, charges may be filed as long as
there is "probable cause."o But for a prosecutor seeking to exercise
authority prudently and fairly, is "probable cause" enough? Or should
the prosecutor refrain from bringing charges unless she is more certain of
the defendant's guilt? Prosecutors regularly interact with crime victims
and other witnesses in the course of investigations and trial preparation."
May prosecutors advise witnesses that they have no obligation to meet
with defense counsel? Doing so may spare the witnesses inconvenience
and possible physical risk, but may also impede the defense counsel's
18. See Levenson, supra note so, at 879 ("Rules are fine, but they will never take the place of
good judgment and a commitment to justice.").
19. See generally Gershman, supra note 16.
20. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUcT R. 3.8(a) (2010).
21. See generally Wilson, supra note 4.
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ability to conduct an effective investigation that may be necessary to
provide good advice and to ensure a fair trial.
Likewise, consider the ordinary work of defense lawyers. Every day,
they meet new clients, introduce themselves and establish the terms of
the lawyer-client relationship. Ethics rules and the attorney-client
privilege guarantee that what the client discloses will ordinarily be kept
confidential, but there are exceptions.22 Sometimes the lawyer may or
must disclose what a client has said." Should defense lawyers simply
promise that what the client says will be kept confidential, even though
exceptions may conceivably apply later, or should they also explain the
exceptions in general terms, or even in detail, at the risk of undermining
the client's trust and discouraging the client's willingness to be
forthcoming?24 Defense lawyers interview their clients and witnesses to
learn information relevant to the representation, subject to the modest
legal limitation that they may not intentionally induce a client or witness
to lie." May defense lawyers employ interviewing techniques that create
a high risk of eliciting false testimony? For example, may they give
clients and witnesses an understanding of the relevant law and legal
theories, even if doing so may influence clients and witnesses to tailor
their accounts?"
Experienced lawyers may not worry over recurring questions such
as these. They may find guidance in office policy, take their cues from
the conduct of those around them," or develop personal practices that,
over time, become rote. But even experienced lawyers may encounter
questions of professional conduct that are outside the mainstream, have
no obvious answer, and require thought. For example, may a prosecutor
accept a guilty plea without revealing to the defense that the prosecution
no longer has a triable case because a key witness has become
unavailable? 5 How should a defense lawyer respond when a client or a
client's relative asks the lawyer to take possession of property that may
be an instrumentality of a crime (such as the proverbial smoking gun),
stolen property, contraband (narcotics or a laptop containing child
pornography), or other evidence of a crime (like a second set of books in
a tax fraud case)?" How should defense lawyers and prosecutors alike
respond when defense lawyers in the jurisdiction regard their caseloads
22. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUcr R. 1.6 (2olo).
23. Id.
24. See generally Klingele, supra note ii.
25. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCr R. 1.2(d), 3.3(a)(3) (2010).
26. See Flowers, supra note 4, at 1021-23.
27. Cf Bruce A. Green, Taking Cues: Inferring Legality from Others' Conduct, 75 FORDHAM L.
REV. 1429 (2oo6) (maintaining that in seeking to understand what ambiguous laws require, law-abiding
individuals, including lawyers, may draw inferences from what other similarly situated individuals do).
28. See Griffin & Caplow, supra note 8, at 858-59.
29. See generally Uphoff, supra note 14.
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as too crushingly onerous to allow them to serve clients competently?
Should the defense lawyers declare themselves unavailable to accept new
appointments? Should prosecutors support defense efforts to obtain
relief?o
There may be no single right answer to these kinds of questions, but
there may be some answers that are better than others, and these are the
ones that lawyers should be encouraged to seek. To be sure, some of
what a lawyer chooses to do within the bounds of the law does not much
matter and may be left to personal taste, values, or philosophy. But much
of what a lawyer does in a criminal case matters to the defendant and to
the public. The public has an interest in prosecutors and defense lawyers
serving their assigned roles not just lawfully, but proficiently, wisely,
prudently, and intelligently. Public confidence in the fairness and
reliability of the criminal justice process depends on lawyers performing
well, not just in a manner consistent with the law. Fairness to individual
defendants demands the same. Therefore, even if enforceable law does
not dictate how prosecutors should exercise charging discretion in a
particular situation or whether defense lawyers should advise clients
about confidentiality obligations and associated exceptions, there is a
value to developing and articulating standards governing this conduct if a
professional consensus can be achieved. In that event, lawyers might be
subject to public or professional opprobrium for departing from the
professional standards.3
But what does it mean to perform well within the bounds of the
law? Traditionally, the law and the legal profession have assumed that
lawyers can infer what the courts and fellow lawyers expect of them,
perhaps through informal means; in other words, there are prevailing
professional norms that are not codified but that lawyers are capable of
ascertaining. If the lawyer's conduct falls too far below conventional
expectations, it may constitute malpractice or constitutionally ineffective
assistance. But avoiding incompetence is not enough. Lawyers are
expected to aim for the high end, not the bare minimum.
How does a new lawyer come to understand what it means to
practice well, and where does an experienced lawyer look for guidance
about unusual questions? Perhaps there was a time when professional
expectations were relatively uncontested and efficiently transmitted. I
recall some years ago chatting with a senior lawyer from Hartford,
Connecticut who told me about professional regulation during his early
years at the bar. If a new lawyer transgressed informal expectations, a
senior lawyer would take him out for a drink-it was invariably a "him"
30. See Lefstein, supra note 12, at 974-82.
31. See generally Bruce A. Green & Fred C. Zacharias, Prosecutorial Neutrality, 2004 Wis. L.
REV. 837, 900-04 (discussing the importance of developing specific standards governing prosecutorial
decisionmaking derived from broadly relevant principles).
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in those days-and kindly explain to him, "that's not how we do things
here." Perhaps in some professional communities, that is still how it is
done. In a prosecutor's office, public defender's office, or private law
firm, professional expectations may be conveyed through mentoring,
training, supervision, policy manuals, and/or other formal or informal
means. Judges may also convey professional expectations through
informal means. But these methods of conveying ideas of good
professional conduct may be inefficient or incomplete.
More significantly, particular understandings within law offices may
be contested. In law offices-small, homogenous, closed professional
communities -conventional ways of operating may not be the best ways.
For example, prosecutors' offices may take a range of approaches to the
exercise of charging discretion. Some may require prosecutors to file
charges whenever there is probable cause. Others may forbid prosecutors
from bringing charges when the prosecutor has a reasonable doubt. It
seems questionable whether each of these approaches, and everything in
between, can be regarded as equally appropriate. Likewise, criminal
defense lawyers discuss confidentiality with their clients in many
different ways. Presumably, some ways are better, some are worse.
There is room for debate about how best to function, because
questions of professional conduct often embody tensions between
legitimate interests that push in opposite directions, giving rise to
conflicting impulses. For example, suppose a prosecutor has a file drawer
of witness statements and other documents relating to a pending
prosecution. The prosecutor knows that constitutional law and
procedural rules require disclosure of only a fraction of the documents
and that under the office's policy, individual prosecutors can decide for
themselves whether to disclose more than the law requires. The
prosecutor knows that the defendant's assigned counsel would provide
better advice and a more vigorous defense with the benefit of the
information- in the additional documents but lacks the time and
investigative resources to learn the information independently. The
prosecutor may not want to disclose more than legally necessary if doing
so will make it unnecessarily difficult to convict a defendant who
genuinely appears guilty," but at the same time, the prosecutor may want
to ensure that any conviction derives from a fair criminal justice process,
which requires that defense counsel competently perform her assigned
role.
Or, to give another example, suppose a criminal defense lawyer has
photocopied judicial opinions that she plans to provide to the trial judge
at a hearing scheduled for later in the day. She knows that the prosecutor
will become antagonistic if copies are not given to him in advance, but
32. See generally Yaroshefsky, supra note 17.
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she also knows that judges in the jurisdiction do not require such notice
to be provided. The defense lawyer may not want to undercut a zealous
defense by giving the prosecutor advance notice of her arguments and
case authority, but may see a personal benefit, if not a benefit to other
clients, in promoting civil relations and minimizing antagonism of
opposing counsel by giving over the cases.33
How should well-intentioned lawyers in these kinds of situations
obtain a broader perspective on the best course of professional conduct
among the available legal and ethical options? Perhaps it would be ideal
for lawyers in these situations to be able to present the relevant facts in
confidence to a group of experienced legal professionals representing
various perspectives-prosecutors, defense lawyers, judges, and academics
from different jurisdictions- and listen to the group hash out the
possibilities against the background of writings that reflect all the prior
wisdom on the subject. The group would be in a position to consider all
of the factual nuances of the concrete situation as well as the particular
context in which the situation arises: for example, the particular
jurisdiction's law and processes, the particular jurisdiction's culture, and
the particular lawyers and judges involved. The problem, of course, is
that there are no such broadly constituted collectives of wise legal
professionals to give lawyers contemporaneous advice about best
practices.34 If there were, it would often be impossible to make use of
them because of time pressures and confidentiality obligations.
If such a diverse group of lawyers cannot realistically come together
to hear lawyers' problems as they arise, study them, deliberate, and then
provide advice about best practices, they can come together to consider
recurring problems and give general written guidance. That is the
objective of those who develop the Criminal Justice Standards for
Prosecution and Defense Functions, currently in their third edition and
under revision again. The last edition was adopted in 1993 "in an attempt
to ascertain a consensus view of all segments of the criminal justice
community about what good, professional practice is and should be," and
with the objective to provide "extremely useful standards for
consultation by lawyers and judges who want to do 'the right thing' or, as
important, to avoid doing 'the wrong thing."'35
33. See Griffin & Caplow, supra note 8, at 865-&7, 872-23.
34. Some bar associations have ethics committees that give advice to lawyers about how the ethics
rules apply to the lawyers' situations, but these committees generally do not give advice about other
law or about how best to exercise judgment and discretion within the context of ethics rules and other
law. See Bruce A. Green, Bar Association Ethics Committees: Are They Broken?, 3o HOFSTRA L. RaV.
731, 747-48 (2oo2). Even with respect to the application of ethics rules to a particular situation, these
committees are not always a realistic source of advice, in part because of confidentiality and timing
considerations. See id. at 745.
35. STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: PROSECUTION FUNCTION AND DEFENSE FUNcTION intro. at
xiv (3d ed. 1993).
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To be sure, this or any other set of published standards for
prosecutors and defense lawyers is less helpful than the guidance that
might in theory be given contemporaneously by a broadly constituted
group of legal professionals in response to a concrete set of facts, if such
a group existed. Standards are invariably general. They cannot capture
and account for all the factual nuances. The more broadly they are
written, the less they are able to account for context. Different
jurisdictions have different laws, processes, and customs; lawyers and
judges in different jurisdictions have different kinds of relationships and
sets of expectations, and so on. Standards cannot always capture all of
the particulars.
On the other hand, standards drafted by a broadly constituted group
offer something different from, and additional to, the realistically
available alternatives. A group drafting standards can spend more time
on a question than can an individual who has to make a decision or give
advice about it in a given case. Likewise, the drafters have time to draw
more fully upon prior writings. If the drafters are broadly inclusive and
seek comments from individuals outside the drafting process, they can
take broader perspectives into account than lawyers and their mentors
dealing with concrete questions on the spot. Both lawyers trying
ultimately to resolve questions for themselves and lawyers giving advice
to others may benefit from the collective work product, in the form of
standards, produced by others over time and through a process of study,
deliberation, notice, and comment. In other words, standards add
something important to the mix. The utility of the Criminal Justice
Standards for Prosecution and Defense Functions in particular is
generally acknowledged. They have been cited on multiple occasions by
the U.S. Supreme Court and by lower courts, and the comment to Rule
3.8 of the ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct specifically refers
to them as a potential source of professional obligation."
II. THE UTILITY OF NATIONAL CONVERSATIONS AND SCHOLARSHIP ON
DRAFr REVISIONS TO THE PROSECUTION AND DEFENSE
FUNCTION STANDARDS
The project that culminated in the companion issues of the Hastings
Law Journal and the Hastings Constitutional Law Quarterly was
occasioned by the revisions to the Criminal Justice Standards for
Prosecution and Defense Functions. The pendency of the revision
process seemed like a good time to encourage conversations and
scholarship regarding professional conduct in criminal cases. As of early
201o, a drafting committee had proposed new versions of the Standards,
36. See Podgor, supra note 3, at 1168-73; Marcus, supra note 3, at lo-It.
37. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUcr R. 3.8 cmt. I (2oo).
[Vol. 62.IO9311loo
DEVELOPING STANDARDS OF CONDUCT
and the Standards Committee, which supervises the production of the
entire set of ABA Criminal Justice Standards, was in the process of
reviewing and revising these drafts.3 Professor Little, the reporter to the
drafting committee, agreed on the utility of inviting academics and
practitioners to discuss the revisions at this midpoint, successfully pitched
the idea to the Standards Committee, and partnered with me in initiating
such discussions.
We viewed law schools, as "neutral turf," to be the ideal setting for
the conversations between prosecutors and defense lawyers, and law
professors to be the ideal moderators and organizers because of their
training in playing devil's advocate, asking probing questions and
eliciting answers from all sides. Although concerns are sometimes
expressed about the "disjunction" between the bar and legal academia,39
there is a large pool of talented academics with a background in criminal
justice and/or legal ethics who are happy to collaborate with lawyers and
judges. More than a dozen law professors around the country agreed to
organize day-long discussions of the revisions to the Standards at their
institutions in fall 201o. The dates of the programs, the law schools where
they were held, and the law professors who organized them, were as
follows:
* September 17, 2oo: University of Wisconsin Law School, Ben
Kempinen and Cecelia Klingele.
* September 25, 2o10: Stetson University College of Law, Roberta
Flowers.
* October 8, 20Io: Loyola Law School Los Angeles, Laurie Levenson.
* October 8, 2oo: Vanderbilt University Law School, Christopher
Slobogin.
* October 15, 20Io: University of California, Hastings College of the
Law, Rory Little.
* October 15, 2olo: Roger Williams University School of Law, Peter
Margulies.
* October 21, 20Io: Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law, Yeshiva
University, Ellen Yaroshefsky.
* October 22, 20Io: Boston College Law School, Michael Cassidy.
* October 22, 20Io: The University of Oklahoma College of Law,
Cheryl Wattley.
* October 29, 20IO: Pace Law School, Bennett Gershman and Lissa
Griffin.
* November 5, 20Io: American University, Washington College of
Law, Angela Davis, Cynthia Jones, and Jenny Roberts.
38. Rory K. Little, The ABA's Project to Revise the Criminal Justice Standards for the Prosecution
and Defense Functions, 62 HASTINGs L.J. IIII, 1114 (201I).
39. See, e.g., Harry T. Edwards, The Growing Disjunction Between Legal Education and the Legal
Profession, 91 MICH. L. REv. 34 (1992) (discussing some of these concerns).
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* November 19, 20IO: The University of Texas School of Law,
Jennifer Laurin.
* November 19, 20IO: Washington and Lee University School of Law,
James Moliterno.
With one exception,4 o these were small, invitational, roundtable-
style discussions among prosecutors, defense lawyers, judges, and
academics, led by academics.4 The general question was whether the
proposed revisions adequately addressed the relevant questions of
professional conduct: For example, did the Standards clearly and fairly
resolve the problems that prosecutors and defense lawyers may
encounter; were the Standards too demanding or too restrictive; and,
were they comprehensive or should they address additional aspects of
the Prosecution Function and the Defense Function? It would have been
impossible, of course, for each group of discussants to survey one or both
sets of the proposed Standards in their entirety, or even to address the
smaller subset of issues covered by all sixteen solicited papers. Instead,
each group generally tackled issues addressed in three or four of the
papers. Participants received the relevant papers and draft revisions of
the Standards in advance. The authors were invited to attend and present
their papers to initiate the discussions. Each organizer identified a
"reporter" to prepare notes of what transpired. The authors of the
papers could later draw on the discussions when they revised their papers
for publication in the Hastings Law Journal and the Hastings
Constitutional Law Quarterly.43 In general, participants regarded the
Standards as valuable and appreciated the quality of the work that has
gone into revising them.
Although the roundtable discussions and writings that grew out of
this project may benefit those engaged in the process of developing and
deliberating over the proposed Standards, that was not the principal
aim." The writings collected in the Hastings Law Journal and the
40. The exception was the program at the University of California, Hastings College of the Law,
entitled "Navigating Prosecutorial Ethics: A Roundtable Discussion on the ABA's Standards for
Criminal Litigation," which was a public symposium organized by Professor Little, as the reporter to
the drafting committee, and co-hosted by the Hastings Law Journal and the Hastings Constitutional
Law Quarterly. The panel discussions examined three topics: pretrial discovery of evidence and Brady
disclosures, media relations, and the practical implications and use of the Standards.
41. The discussion conducted at American University, Washington College of Law, was recorded
and is representative of the discussions overall. See Discussion of Proposed ABA Prosecution and
Defense Function Standards, AM. U. WASH. C.L. (Nov. 5, 20oo), http://www.wcl.american.edu/podcast/
audio/20101 ILoWCLABA-i.mp3; http-/www.wcl.american.edulpodcast/audio/2oioI n.o_WCLABA-
2.mp3.
42. The reporters' summaries are available from the Author upon request.
43. See, e.g., Wilson, supra note 4, at 1232-33 (noting the value of the discussions to the
development of her Article). See generally Klingele, supra note ii (describing views of discussants).
44. The roundtable discussions are not formally part of the process of revising and adopting new
Standards. Roundtable discussants' reactions to the Standards may or may not lead to revisions for a
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Hastings Constitutional Law Quarterly are meant to benefit those who
seek to understand better the complexities of professional conduct
questions that implicate the Standards and to address those questions
that may not be fully resolved by the Standards. Further, the discussions
themselves provided a vehicle and model for bringing together
prosecutors, defense lawyers, judges, and academics for civil, honest,
well-informed discussions about professional conduct.'5 Ideally, the
project has raised awareness of the Standards within the academic and
professional communities and the Hastings Law Journal and the Hastings
Constitutional Law Quarterly will raise further awareness, thereby
assisting the ABA in its efforts to influence and guide professional
conduct through the publication and updating of the Standards. Not
incidentally, the project has promoted scholarly consideration of the
Standards and prosecutors' and defense lawyers' professional conduct
generally. In a small way, the project has sought to bridge the gap
between the bar and the legal academy to the mutual benefit of each.
III. THE IMPORTANCE OF EXAMINING STANDARDS OF
CONDUCT IN CONTEXT
If any single insight emerges from contemplating the proposed
Standards, participating in the roundtable discussions, and reading the
papers, it is that standards of professional conduct do not exist in
isolation. They exist in relation to the law and to broader principles
about the lawyer's role. Additionally, each set of Standards exists in
relation to the other. That is because expectations for prosecutors
depend in part on the expectations for defense lawyers, and vice versa-
not in the sense that the Standards for each should be symmetrical, but in
the sense that the expectations are often reciprocal. Therefore, the
project of developing and articulating professional standards is indeed a
big project and an important one.
A. THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN MINIMAL LEGAL OBLIGATIONS AND
PROFESSIONAL STANDARDS
The ethics rules and other bodies of law governing lawyers are a
starting point for professional standards. The law establishes legally
enforceable, minimum conduct requirements-what lawyers must or
must not do, under penalty of sanction. Standards give lawyers guidance
host of reasons, including the difficulty of achieving consensus among stakeholders, who reasonably
may disagree about questions of best professional practice, and the importance of viewing revisions to
individual Standards in the broader context of the entire set of ABA Standards.
45. See Yaroshefsky, supra note 17, at 1347 ("The roundtable discussions that occurred at law
schools throughout the country provided a unique opportunity for many judges, prosecutors, defense
lawyers, and academics to gather and consider whether and to what extent these Standards are useful
or necessary and what role they should assume in the criminal justice process.").
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about how to conduct themselves within the bounds of the law.
Sometimes law and standards are coextensive: the standard may say, in
effect, "comply with the law and nothing more," 4 or, less often, the law
may say, in effect, "you must act consistently with the standard."47 For
the most part, however, they do different work. Even so, looking at them
together yields insights into both the law and the standards.
Looking at law and standards together may yield insights into how
either or both should develop. The ideal balance between law and
standards is not always clear. To some extent, lawyers' professional
conduct is, and should be, dictated by law. To a large extent, lawyers and
their offices must be allowed to exercise discretion and judgment with
the guidance of uncodified expectations, unenforceable standards, and
other professional writings. A question for those who establish ethics
rules and other law governing lawyers' professional conduct is, "when
should a course of conduct be dictated by law, and when should lawyers
be exempt from legal dictates?" If one is satisfied with the content and
clarity of standards, and confident that lawyers will act consistently with
them, one will be more inclined to broaden lawyers' discretion. Looking
at the law and standards in conjunction may sometimes contribute to
answering this question.
For example, consider the question addressed by Professor
Moliterno: What should a defense lawyer do when she learns
confidentially, in the course of representing a client, that someone else
has been wrongly convicted?48 Two state ethics codes expressly allow
lawyers to disclose client confidences in this situation, but other state
ethics codes do not and might be read to forbid lawyers from disclosing
client confidences in this situation without the client's consent.49
Recently, the leadership of the ABA Criminal Justice Section debated
whether to seek revisions to the ABA Model Rules of Professional
Conduct on this subject but ultimately decided not to do so. As the
discussion made clear, there are many aspects of and complexities to this
debate. The extent to which the addition of an exception to the
confidentiality duty will chill clients' disclosures is an important, but
empirically unresolvable, question. Another important question,
however, relates to standards and their influence: Can a standard
sufficiently identify the rare situations when it would be appropriate to
disclose client confidences in order to rectify a wrongful conviction, and
46. For example, the current Standards on public statements essentially restate the prevailing
ethics rule. See STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: PROSECUTION FUNCTION § 3-1.4 (3d ed. 1993);
STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: DEFENSE FUNCTION § 4-1-4 (3 d ed. 1993); see also MODEL RULES OF
PROF'L CONDucr R. 3.6(a), 3.8(f) (200).
47. See, e.g., Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S. Ct. 1473 (200).
48. See generally Molitemo, supra note 13.
49. Id. at 821-23.
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would lawyers abide by the standard? If agreement can be reached on
written standards that capture these rare situations, and one is confident
that the standards will have influence, then one might be more inclined
to leave the decision to lawyers' discretion. Otherwise, one might be
more inclined toward an enforceable rule that, in order to prevent abuses
of discretion, categorically forbids disclosure."o
Standards have the potential to influence the development of the
law, and an awareness of that possibility may be a consideration in how
the standards themselves are developed. The Supreme Court's recent
decision in Padilla v. Kentucky illustrates the role that standards may
play in helping determine whether defense counsel's conduct falls below
a standard of reasonableness, which is one element of constitutionally
ineffective assistance of counsel." But the influence of professional
standards can take other forms. Consider, for example, legal questions
associated with conflicts of interest in the criminal context, including
questions about when courts should disqualify defense lawyers or
prosecutors, when courts should overturn convictions based on defense
lawyers' alleged conflicts of interest, and when lawyers should be
personally sanctioned for failing to decline or withdraw from a
representation, obtain client consent, or otherwise to respond properly to
a conflict of interest. These questions are not resolved by statute so much
as by case law developed under the Sixth Amendment right to counsel or
by court-adopted ethics rules. As Professor Levenson's contribution
reflects, there are myriad questions relevant to determining how
prosecutors, defense lawyers, and courts should deal with conflicts -
almost certainly too many questions to resolve in the Criminal Justice
Standards for Prosecution and Defense Functions. A project devoted
exclusively to expanding the Standards relating to conflicts of interest in
the criminal context might be worthwhile. To the extent that a consensus
could be developed around more detailed Standards that fill the gaps in
case law, it is likely that the Standards would influence courts'
development of subsequent case law.53
Similarly, the Standard on peremptory challenges might not only
guide lawyers on how to exercise discretion within the bounds of the law,
but also influence what direction the law takes. As Professor Podgor
describes, the Standards Committee revising the Criminal Justice
Standards for Prosecution and Defense Functions has wrestled with
whether prosecutors and/or defense lawyers should be advised against
50. See generally Bruce A. Green & Fred C. Zacharias, Permissive Rules of Professional Conduct,
91 MINN. L. REV. 265 (2oo6).
51. 13o S. Ct. at 1482.
52. See generally Levenson, supra note Io.
53. See, e.g., United States v. Flanagan, 679 F.2d 1072, 1075 n.2 (3d Cir. 1982).
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striking jurors based on sexual orientation,54 even if it may be permissible
under current law to use a challenge on this basis." The ultimate
outcome of this debate will likely determine what position the ABA may
take as amicus curiae if the constitutional question comes before the
Supreme Court. In the meantime, the debate may influence how state
courts and lower federal courts view the constitutional question.
Standards on many subjects cannot be developed meaningfully
without reference to the relevant law. For example, the Standards on
conflicts of interest,,6 peremptory challenges," prosecutorial disclosure,'
and summations" are closely intertwined with legal standards governing
the same general conduct. The law that establishes the bounds within
which lawyers may act may be too restrictive, too permissive, or too
ambiguous. The process of discussing, developing, and studying standards
such as the Criminal Justice Standards for Prosecution and Defense
Functions may reveal when the law is incomplete or deficient.
Consider, for example, defense lawyers' receipt of physical items or
documents that may be evidence, contraband, or fruits or instrumentalities
of a crime. As Professor Uphoff discusses, the intuition underlying the
relevant Standard is that while lawyers should not destroy these items,
neither should they produce these items to law enforcement authorities
in a manner that implicates the client if it is legally possible to avoid
doing so.6 However, the relevant case law, derived from the criminal law
on obstruction of justice and related offenses, does not easil
accommodate the kind of conduct that might be considered optimal.
The cases potentially require lawyers to implicate their clients in
situations where, given the choice, lawyers ideally would refrain from
61doing so. Studying how the Standards apply in this context may lead to
the conclusion that the law is potentially too demanding and ought to be
reformed or clarified. On the other hand, a discussion of the Standards
governing witness preparation may lead some to the opposite conclusion:
namely, that some interviewing and preparation techniques should be
54. See Podgor, supra note 3, at 1173-75.
55. Compare People v. Garcia, 92 Cal. Rptr. 2d 339, 347-48 (Ct. App. 2ooo) (finding that sexual
orientation is a protected class for jury selection purposes), with United States v. Ehrmann, 421 F-3d
774, 782 (8th Cir. 2005) (expressing doubt that sexual orientation is a protected class for jury selection
purposes).
56. See generally Levenson, supra note lo.
57. See Podgor, supra note 3, at 1173-75.
58. See generally Yaroshefsky, supra note 17.
59. See generally Medwed, supra note 7.
6o. See Uphoff, supra note 14, at i185-97.
61. See id. atu i8-9o.
62. See id. at 189-9o.
ilio6 [Vol. 62:Io93
DEVELOPING STANDARDS OF CONDUCT
placed off limits by ethics rules or other law and not left to lawyers'
discretion because of their excessive potential to lead to false testimony.6 3
B. THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN PROFESSIONAL STANDARDS AND
PROFESSIONAL ROLES
The articulation of professional standards for how lawyers should
conduct themselves within the bounds of the law logically begins not only
with the relevant law but with an understanding of lawyers' roles. In their
contribution, Professors Griffin and Caplow point out that the draft
revisions to the Prosecution Function Standards more fully explicate the
prosecutor's role than does the current edition.' They show that the
differences may be significant for how prosecutors approach questions of
civility, cooperation, and candor in their relationship with defense
lawyers.
Developing a consensus regarding the professional role of lawyers in
the criminal context may not be easy, but it is essential to establishing the
legitimacy of proposed standards. Consider a question explored by
Professor Lefstein: whether prosecutors should seek to remedy
deficiencies in the delivery of indigent defense services occasioned by
such problems as excessive caseloads and resource limitations.6 Based on
the prosecutors' function not only to seek justice but also to seek
improvements to the administration of criminal justice, Professor
Lefstein advocates a prosecutorial obligation to refrain from exploiting
such weaknesses.6 The antecedent question, of course, is whether the
role of a prosecutor necessarily includes a law reform function, which
may be an unaccustomed one for many in that position.
Professor Kempinen's article on problem-solving courts6 illustrates
the importance of focusing on lawyers' role from the defense side. As he
describes, problem-solving courts may call on defense lawyers to serve
roles other than the traditional one of zealous advocate for a client.6
Defense lawyers may be expected to play a collaborative role that is
inconsistent with that of carrying out the client's objectives and
preserving the client's confidences. The Defense Function Standards do
not elaborate on a defense lawyer's role in the context of drug courts,
mental health courts, community courts, and the like. Those who may
eventually develop specific professional standards for defense lawyers
representing clients in problem-solving courts will have to begin by
63. See generally Flowers, supra note 4.
64. Griffin & Caplow, supra note 8, at 850-53.
65. Id.
66. See generally Lefstein, supra note 12.
67. Id. at 974-79.
68. Kempinen, supra note 15.
69. Id. at 1353-54-
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grappling with the question of whether, with or without a client's
consent, defense lawyers functioning in these settings can depart from
the traditional adversarial role.
C. THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN PROSECUTION AND DEFENSE FUNCTION
STANDARDS
The committee responsible for revising the Criminal Justice
Standards for Prosecution and Defense Functions has worked on both
sets of Standards simultaneously, rather than in succession. This
approach reflects the recognition that neither prosecution nor defense
conduct should be viewed in isolation. Rather, they are best considered
in relation with each other.
This is not to say that prosecutor and defense lawyer standards
regarding comparable conduct should be symmetrical. One might start
with the intuition that, because prosecutors and defense lawyers are
counterparts in the same adversary process and encounter similar
questions, the relevant standards ought to be the same. But the intuition
will not always hold up under scrutiny, because prosecutors and defense
lawyers have very different roles -prosecutors as "ministers of justice,"o
first and foremost, and defense lawyers as zealous advocates on behalf of
individual clients.
Consider, for example, the question raised earlier of whether a
lawyer should advise a potential witness about the background law,
knowing that doing so may, if only unintentionally, influence the witness
to recall events in an untruthful, self-serving manner. One might initially
assume that this conduct should be either permitted or forbidden for
prosecutors and defense lawyers alike. However, as Professor Wilson
discusses, "The proposed Defense Standard tacitly recognizes that
prosecutors and defense lawyers play different roles in the criminal
justice process and that different standards and expectations are,
therefore, appropriate. The prosecutor's goal should be justice; defense
counsel's goal is freedom for the accused."" The distinction might be
developed further. Compare the defense lawyer advising a defendant-
client about the law applicable to her case, with a prosecutor advising a
police officer who is being prepared to testify in a suppression hearing
about what facts will and will not support the admission of evidence. The
defense lawyer has an obligation to give advice to enable the client to
make informed decisions;" the prosecutor has no comparable obligation
to advise police officers and other government witnesses. In general,
70. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUcT R. 3.8 cmt. I (2010) ("A prosecutor has the responsibility
of a minister of justice and not simply that of an advocate."); see also Bruce A. Green, Why Should
Prosecutors "Seek Justice"?, 26 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 607 (1999).
71. Wilson, supra note 4, at 117.
72. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDucr R. 1.4(b) (200).
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defense lawyers have a responsibility ultimately to accept their clients'
factual accounts, and refusing to do so may undermine the client trust
that is presumed to be essential to an effective lawyer-client relationship.
Prosecutors, on the other hand, have a responsibility to ensure a fair
process, which suggests an obligation to promote the veracity of their
witnesses' testimony, rather than to employ interviewing and preparation
techniques that are likely to elicit or encourage false accounts. Similar
distinctions might be drawn when it comes to other comparable conduct,
such as communications with the press" or summations.74
At the same time, it seems important to view prosecution and
defense conduct in tandem, because how one should behave will often
depend in part on how the other behaves. This is true in many areas.
Should defense lawyers turn over inculpatory physical evidence? One
may be more inclined to say "yes" if there is an understanding that the
prosecutor will not use that act against the defendant. Should prosecutors
produce significantly more evidence and information to the defense
before trial than the law requires? One may be more inclined to say
"yes" if there is an understanding that defense lawyers will protect
against the information being used to intimidate or improperly influence
witnesses. Should defense lawyers disclose client confidences to
exonerate a wrongly convicted third party? One may be more inclined to
say "no" if the prosecutor is likely to use the information against the
lawyer's client and cannot be counted on to investigate diligently to
determine whether there was a miscarriage of justice. Should prosecutors
ask courts to disqualify defense lawyers who appear to have conflicts of
interest? One may be more inclined to say "no" if defense lawyers can be
trusted to take their ethical obligations under the conflict rules seriously.
In the end, although the professional expectations relating to prosecutors
and defense lawyers should not necessarily be symmetrical, they should
be reciprocal in many respects.
CONCLUSION
The two issues of the Hastings Law Journal and the Hastings
Constitutional Law Quarterly are the product of collaboration. The
leadership and staff of the ABA Criminal Justice Section, and the
73. Professor Taslitz's contribution suggests various reasons why the expectations for prosecutors
and defense lawyers should not necessarily be the same, including that prosecutors' public statements
are likely to have a greater impact on prospective jurors and that the justifications for their
communications with the press generally differ. Taslitz, supra note 5, at 1292, 1308-10.
74. See Medwed, supra note 7, at 917 ("The standards [on summation] are essentially identical for
the two sides. This approach is admirable in many respects: A blatant stab at equal treatment for all
advocates in the criminal trial process. Yet this balanced approach ignores the reality that summation
misconduct varies considerably for prosecutors and defense lawyers given their different systemic roles
and, just as important, differences in how jurors perceive those roles.").
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members of the Standards Committee, were instrumental in supporting
the idea of a national conversation on the revisions to the Criminal
Justice Standards for Prosecution and Defense Functions. Most
especially, invaluable assistance was provided by Professor Rory Little,
the reporter to the drafting committee; by Judge Marty Marcus, who
chairs the Standards Committee; by Jack Hanna, executive director of
the ABA Criminal Justice Section, and his staff; and, by Ron Goldstock,
an officer of the ABA Criminal Justice Section who has long participated
in the Standards process. Every one of the thirteen law schools listed
above" and their faculty, who organized discussions of the Standards,
and all those who participated in the discussions as discussants,
moderators, and reporters, provided a model for civil and productive
professional discourse, interaction, and collaboration. Through their
writings and participation in last fall's discussions, the sixteen authors
represented in the two Hastings publications, some of whom served
double duty as organizers of discussions, made indispensable
contributions to those conversations and to the ongoing scholarly debate.
Developing better understandings of professional practice is not a
solitary pursuit. It takes many. Many thanks to all!
75. See discussion supra pp. 1101-02.
